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1. In countless dimensions of social life, in the relationships between people, 
between people and organizations and between organizations, it is possible to 
identify ways of supremacy which grant a power of imposing upon others the 
practice of a given behaviour. Many of those subordination relationships are legally 
acknowledged and find in legal planning a definition of the terms in which they may 
be constituted and materialized in that command power.
The military organization is, by definition, structured in a hierarchical model 
which is filled with content exactly through the subordinate’s duty of obedience 
towards the orders of the hierarchical superior.
In the Portuguese military criminal law, the duty to obey orders has express legal 
consecration in several legal precepts:
«The soldier […] has as special duties […]: to fully and promptly execute 
the orders relative to service» (article 4, no. 2, of the Regulation of the 
Military Discipline1)
1  Decree-Law no. 142/77, of April, 9.
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«The plea of obedience is consequence of the provisioned in military laws 
and regulations and expresses in the full and prompt fulfilment of their 
norms, as well as of the determinations, orders and instructions emanated 
by hierarchical superior delivered in matter of service given that the 
fulfilment does not imply crime practice» (article 12 of the Statute of the 
Army Soldiers2)
In the Portuguese legal system, according to the article 271, no. 3, of the Republic 
Constitution, of 19763, and with the aforementioned article 12 of the Statue of the 
Army Soldiers, it is absolutely undisputed, in criminal matter, the non obligation 
of an order which may lead to the practice of a crime, any crime. The reach of the 
mentioned norm is very clear: the obedience is not due when the execution of the 
order implies the practice of a fact described as a crime4.
In principle, the exclusion of unlawfulness of a typical fact committed by a soldier 
when carrying out a superior order may only occur when that order is legitimate. An 
order cannot by itself, regardless its conformity to legal planning, eliminate the 
criminal unlawfulness of the typical fact performed in its execution.
Being the behaviour of the subordinate criminally unlawful, as it is the practice 
of a typical fact in obedience to an illegitimate order, the imputation of due criminal 
liability depends yet, naturally, on the existence of culpability (Schuld). Here is 
important to know if the fact that the soldier acted under order has any special effect 
in the guilt stage of criminal responsibility. More specifically, if culpability may be 
excluded by direct effect of obedience to an illegitimate superior order and, if so, on 
which grounds and under which presuppositions. 
The exclusion of guilt by obedience (excuse), similarly to exclusion of 
unlawfulness (justification) by obedience, is often associated to the issue of 
compulsory illegitimate orders5. In fact, exclusion of unlawfulness and exclusion 
of guilt are as two sides of the same coin. In the context of compulsory illegitimate 
orders, the exclusion of guilt appears normally as the getaway to counterbalance 
the denial of exclusion of unlawfulness and the opposition to the justification 
theory. Therefore, more important than to fundament the excuse is to contradict the 
2  Decree-Law no. 236/99, of June, 25.
3  It is established in article 271, no. 3, of the Constitution, that «the duty to obey orders ceases 
whenever the execution of the orders or instructions implies the practice of any crime».
4  Cf. Dias, Jorge de Figueiredo, Direito Penal. Parte Geral, Tomo I: Questões Fundamentais. A 
Doutrina Geral do Crime, Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 2004, 18.º Cap. § 7 et seq., and Brandão, Nuno, 
Justificação e Desculpa por Obediência em Direito Penal, Coimbra Editora, 2006, p. 251 et seq.
5  Cf. in detail, Brandão, Nuno, Justificação e Desculpa por Obediência em Direito Penal, § 9.
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exclusion of unlawfulness. Hence, the exclusion of guilt is often taken as a fact, with 
no need to realize its fundament or to explicit its presuppositions6.
Generally, the excuse related with the execution of an order is grounded on 
duress or error. Obviously, an exclusion of guilt of the soldier who acts unlawfully 
in fulfilment of an order may be reached through one of the several general 
circumstances which excuse the author, some regarding duress and some others 
regarding error. However, the only issue that needs to be understood in this context 
is the exclusion of culpability directly related to obedience to superior orders. 
Therefore, given that there is, in the Portuguese positive law, a cause of exclusion of 
guilt specifically related to this issue, the excusing undue obedience of article 37 of 
the Portuguese Penal Code, we will focus our attention in it: «the civil servant who 
executes an order without knowing that it leads to the practice of a crime acts without 
culpability, if this is not manifest in the frame of circumstances that he knew».
In this study, we will seek to clarify the nature and application scope of this 
excuse of the Portuguese criminal law and find out its contact points with similar 
circumstances existing in foreign national criminal laws.
2. In a first assessment, we shall find the fundamental idea that justifies this 
excusing undue obedience defence. At first thought, duress should be put away 
as a principle which fundaments it. In that sense states the legal text of article 
37 of the Penal Code, which points directly to the domain of error in the part it 
circumscribes the excused action by undue obedience to the cases of the execution 
of an order not knowing that it leads to the practice of a crime: «the civil servant who 
executes an order without knowing that it leads to the practice of a crime acts without 
culpability». 
The excuse by duress has been supported in literature from two different 
perspectives. The truth, however, is that not only those two points of view do not 
find legal basis in article 37 of the Penal Code, but also reveal to be unfounded.
A significant part of those who support excusing theories in the context of the 
debate around compulsory illegitimate orders defended duress as fundament for 
6  Cf., v. g., Santos, Beleza dos, Lições de Direito Penal (Causas de Justificação do Facto)
(Apontamentos segundo as prelecções ao curso do V ano jurídico de 1941-42, coligidos por Maria 
de Nazareth Lobato Guimarães), Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1946, p. 111 et seq., Mezger, Tratado 
de Derecho Penal, 2nd ed., Madrid, 1955, § 30, II, 2, Amelung, Knut, «Die Rechtfertigung von 
Polizeivollzugsbeamten», Juristische Schulung, 1986, p. 337, Küper, Wilfried, «Grundsatzfragen der 
„Differenzierung» zwischen Rechtfertigung und Entschuldigung. Notstand, Pflichtenkollision, Handeln 
auf dienstliche Weisung», JuS, 1987, p. 92, Dreher, Eduard / Tröndle, Herbert, Strafgesetzbuch und 
Nebengesetze, 47. Auf., München: C. H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995, before § 32, no. 
16, Lackner, Karl / Kühl, Kristian, Strafgesetzbuch mit Erläuterungen, 22. Auf., München: C. H. 
Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1997, before § 13, no. 27, and Toledo, Francisco de Assis, Ilicitude 
Penal e Causas de sua Exclusão, São Paulo: Ed. Forense, 1984, pp. 120 et seq. and e 138 et seq.
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exclusion of guilt by execution of illegitimate orders. This fundament is used by those 
who simultaneously accept the existence of compulsory illegitimate orders recur to 
this fundament, but refuse to give justifying effects to them: while a duty to obey is 
imposed to the agent, it is obvious that he may not be censured by committing the 
ordained fact, as no other behaviour is to be requested from him. This reason took 
some of those who admitted the existence of compulsory illegitimate orders, but 
who opposed to the fact that they could justify the execution, to consider that the 
subordinate’s culpability should be excluded in the frame of the excusing necessity7.
The basic presupposition underlying this position is the existence of compulsory 
illegitimate orders in criminal matter. This presupposition is not only unacceptable 
regarding principles8, but it is also inadmissible in face of Portuguese positive law, 
which expressly establishes the termination of the duty of obedience whenever 
the order leads to the practice of any crime. Therefore, all consequences that the 
described thesis derives from the statement of those compulsory illegitimate orders 
fall to the ground, more specifically the exclusion of guilt by duress.
Besides the invocation of duress as a fundament for exclusion of guilt in case 
of obedience to illegitimate orders as a direct result from the position assumed in 
the context of the discussion regarding compulsory illegitimate orders, another 
perspective arises, in Spanish doctrine, which defends an exclusion of guilt from the 
civil servant or the soldier who unduly obeys a superior order, which is based in a 
principle of duress identified with the fear of possible personal disadvantages which 
may derive from not abiding the order. Antón Oneca admitted the excuse of the 
subordinate who executes an order which he knows or suspects to be illegitimate, 
grounded in the idea that «the fear of disciplinary sanctions, the habit of discipline 
which mechanizes conduct and also the suggestion exercised by the chief’s authority 
and prestige may create, in concrete cases, situations which, from the subjective 
point of view, are not free and from the objective point of view are not reprehensible, 
because in similar conditions most people would have done the same» 9.
7  Cf. Liszt, Franz v. / Schmidt, Eberhard, Lehrbuch26, § 42, V, p. 288, Sauer, Wilhelm, 
Allgemeine Strafrechtslehre, 3. Auf., Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1955, § 18, B, II, 2, Kohlrausch, 
Eduard / Lange, Richard, Strafgesetzbuch mit Erläuterungen und Nebengesetzen, 39. und 40. Auflage, 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1950, before § 51, II, Mezger, Edmund, in: Strafgesetzbuch. Leipziger 
Kommentar, I, 8. Auf., Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1957, before § 51, 12, a), and Welzel, Derecho 
Penal, Parte General, 11 ed., Editorial Jurídica de Chile, § 15, II, 2. In a close direction, Díaz Palos, 
Fernando, «Obediencia Debida», Nueva Enciclopedia Jurídica, XVII, Barcelona: ed. Francisco Seix, 
1982, p. 751 et seq., and in the present Italian doctrine, Fiandaca, Giovanni / Musco, Enzo, Diritto 
Penale. Parte Generale, 3rd ed., 1999, p. 366, who point criminal orders not subject to inspection in 
article 51-4 of the Italian Penal Code as a case of duress.
8  Brandão, Nuno, Justificação e Desculpa por Obediência em Direito Penal, p. 241 et seq.
9  Antón Oneca, José, Derecho Penal. Parte General, I, Madrid, 1949, p. 274. Cf. also Saínz 
Cantero, José Antonio, La Exigibilidad de Conducta Adecuada a la Norma en Derecho Penal, 
Granada: Universidad de Granada, 1965, p. 144.
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One must not assume, however, that this principle position may only be found in 
the old literature. The truth is that even in the present Spanish doctrine the exclusion 
of the subordinate’s guilt is still defended «because of the pressure which may be 
imposed upon him by the hierarchical relationship»10, «when the subordinate knows 
that the order is criminal and, thus, not compulsory […] and, notwithstanding its non 
compulsion, in face of certain conditions, such as fear of disciplinary sanctions, of 
loosing the job, etc. […], executes it without being demanded from him a different 
action by the law, because most citizens would have done the same in similar 
situations»11. 
It is an undeniable fact that obedience may be imposed in such a context that one 
must only conclude by an exclusion of culpability grounded in duress. However, this 
is far from meaning that the subordination relationship may be by itself a factor of 
pressure over the civil servant or the soldier that may excuse them whenever they 
are not able to deny obedience to an order directed to the practice of a crime. To be 
able to speak of a genuine duress, it is not enough that the subordinate feels helpless 
to disobey the criminal order transmitted to him. On the contrary, it is necessary that 
the order is accompanied by the threat of severe reprisals to the soldier should he 
disobey, which may not be avoided but by obeying.
It must, then, be concluded that most of the situations pointed by Spanish 
literature as situations of duress do not correspond to a real state of necessity, 
because the inhibition to fulfil the command imposed by the incriminating norm 
comes essentially from a strictly personal incapacity from the civil servant or the 
soldier to abide the law and not from the environment situation12 of subordination 
that covers the transmission of the order.
The exclusion of culpability by duress in case of obedience to an order which 
may imply the practice of a crime does not constitute, therefore, a direct effect of 
that order and may only be accepted when the terms in which the order is transmitted 
and executed set a situation of excusing necessity defined by article 35 of the Penal 
Code13. For that, it is necessary that the subordinate is coerced to execute the order 
10  Vives Antón, Tomas Salvador, «Consideraciones Político-criminales en Torno a la Obediencia 
Debida», Estudios Penales y Criminologicos, V, 1982, p. 141.
11  Morillas Cueva, Lorenzo, La Obediencia Debida. Aspectos Legales y Político-criminales, 
Madrid: Civitas, 1984, p. 153.
12  Correia, Eduardo, Unidade e Pluralidade de Infracções, in: A Teoria do Concurso em Direito 
Criminal, p. 215.
13  Like this, Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 4 et seq., Weber, Hellmuth von, «Die 
strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit für Handeln auf Befehl», MDR, 1948, p. 39 et seq., Stratenwerth, 
Günter, Verantwortung und Gehorsam. Zur strafrechtlichen Wertung hoheitlich gebotenen Handelns, 
Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1958, p. 182, Maurach, Reinhart / Zipf, Heinz, Derecho Penal. Parte 
General, I, Astrea, 1994, § 34, no. 25, Jescheck, Hans-Heinrich / Weigend, Thomas, Lehrbuch des 
Strafrechts. Allgemeiner Teil, 5. Auf., Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996, § 35, II, 5, Lenckner, 
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under threat of death or damage of physical integrity, honour or freedom, and that 
the remaining presuppositions of article 35 of the Penal Code, combined with article 
13 of de Code of Military Law14, are verified. Apart from these cases, an excuse 
grounded on duress in case of obedience to a criminal order may not be stated.
3. The exclusion of culpability by excusing undue obedience foreseen in article 
37 of the Portuguese Penal Code does not derive from duress, but from the error
the soldier incurs in and which determines the execution of the order that leads 
to the practice of a crime. It must, however, be clarified which is the type of error 
herewith in cause and which is the content of the criterion of non censorship. For 
that, besides the understanding of the reflexion that has been dedicated to excusing 
undue obedience in Portuguese doctrine, it is important to understand the terms in 
which in German literature several legal dispositions have been interpreted, as § 5, I 
of Wehrstrafgesetz (WStG) and § 11, II of Soldatengesetz (SoldG), which redaction 
is almost the same as article 37 of the Portuguese Penal Code.
3.1. The present debate of German literature regarding exclusion of guilt in case 
of obedience to illegitimate orders occurs around some legal dispositions in which 
the debate concerning compulsory illegitimate orders is centred, namely of the § 
5, I of WStG and § 11, II of SoldG, which apply to soldiers, and § 7, II of UZwG, 
directed to execution civil servants. According to theses precepts, it only acts with 
guilt that soldier or civil servant who commits an unlawful fact which fills the type 
of a criminal law when knowing that the order implies the practice of an unlawful 
fact or when that is evident according to the circumstances he is aware of.
Most doctrine associates those legal dispositions to the matter of error. But while 
some do it directly, considering that they form special regulations of excusing error, 
some others consider that those precepts embody causes for exclusion of guilt of an 
autonomous nature which act in situations of error. The lack of consensus occurs, 
furthermore, regarding the types of error covered by the dispositions in question. 
Although the dominating tendency is to identify § 5, I of WStG, § 11, II of SoldG 
and § 7, II of UZwG with mistake of law (Verbotsirrtum), it is common to find 
positions that extend the regulation of these legal norms also to situations of error 
about the type (Tatbestandsirrtum), either expressly15, or implicitly, considering 
Theodor, in: Schönke / Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch Kommentar, 26. Aufl., München: C. H. Beck, 
2001, before § 32, no. 121, and Ambos, Kai, «Zur strafbefreienden Wirkung des «Handeln auf Befehl» 
aus deutscher und völkerstrafrechtlicher Sicht», JR, 1998, p. 222.
14  Law no. 100/03, of November, 15.
15  Cf. Sch / Sch / Lenckner26, before § 32, no. 121, and Baumann, Jürgen / Weber, Ulrich / 
Mitsch, Wolfgang, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 10. Auf., Bielefeld: Ernst und Gieseking, 1995, § 23, 
no. 52.
293
The Defence of Superior Orders in Portuguese and in Compared Military ...
cases that in reality set an error about presuppositions of a justification cause (Erlau
bnistatbestandsirrtum) as cases of error about prohibition (Verbotsirrtum)16.
Part of the doctrine includes, however, the mentioned legal dispositions only 
in Verbotsirrtum. According to Stratenwerth, the knowledge or the evidence those 
dispositions refer to regards only the juridical valuation of the ordained conduct17. In 
the same sense, Jakobs considers that those precepts intervene when the subordinate 
ignores the unlawfulness of the fact which is object of the order, softening the 
general regulation of Verbotsirrtum of § 17 StGB18. According to Jakobs, exclusion 
of guilt in those cases when criminal unlawfulness is not evident bearing in mind the 
circumstances that the subordinate is aware of is due to the need to ensure the speed 
in the execution of the state decisions, whereas if the risk of error from general rules 
would be imposed upon soldiers and execution civil servants, the execution of state 
acts would be affected by possible clarifications about the juridical qualification of 
the ordained fact which civil servants would be authorised to do or ask.
It is, therefore, granted to the subordinate a bigger margin of error. The law, 
according to Roxin and Schroeder’s understanding, is based on the theory of 
culpability (Schuldtheorie) and acts upon the criterion of error censorship, decreasing 
the demands of avoidance (Vermeidbarkeit)19.
Therefore, punishment is reserved for those cases in which error about unlawfulness 
is easily avoidable. So, Roxin considers that law consecrates a solution which may 
be assimilated in its category of liability (Verantwortlichkeit), which comprises guilt 
and the needs of prevention20. From his point of view, as per § 17 StGB, it should 
be considered unavoidable not only the error committed by complete impossibility 
of accessing the awareness of unlawfulness, but also the error regarding which one 
may state that the agent fulfilled the requirements assumed by the normal fidelity to 
law. Therefore, when awareness of the conduct unlawfulness may only be obtained 
by extreme efforts, regardless the existence of a low guilt, the fact that those efforts 
are not demandable to the agent conducts to the exclusion of his criminal liability21. 
16  Maurach / Zipf, DP-PG7, I, § 38, no. 25.
17  Stratenwerth, Verantwortung und Gehorsam, p. 205.
18  Jakobs, Günther, Derecho Penal. Parte General. Fundamentos y teoría de la imputación, 2nd 
ed., Madrid: Marcial Pons, 1997, 19/53. In this direction, cf. also Roxin, Claus, Strafrecht, Allgemeneir 
Teil, Bd. 1: Grundlagen; Der Aufbau der Verbrechenslehre, 3. Aufl., München: C. H. Beck, 1997, § 21, 
no. 73, e Schroeder, Friedrich-Christian, in: Jähnke / Laufhütte / Odersky (Hrsg.), Strafgesetzbuch, 
Leipziger Kommentar, Grosskommentar, 11. n. Auf., 14. Lieferung: §§ 15-18, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1994, § 17, no. 52 et seq.
19  Roxin, AT3, § 21, no. 73, e Schroeder, LK11, § 17, no. 54. both oppose, therefore, to the 
position of Maurach / Zipf, DP-PG7, I, § 38, no. 29, who see in § 5 I of WStG an expression of the 
limited theory of dolus.
20  Cf. Roxin, AT3, § 19.
21  Roxin, AT3, § 21, no. 37.
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Hence, even if there is a lessen guilt, an error about the prohibition may exclude 
liability when renounce to punishment is compatible with preventive functions of 
criminal law22. Therefore, Roxin’s understanding is that, although there are cases in 
which the subordinate acts with guilt due to the possibility of avoiding error about 
the unlawfulness of the ordained fact, when unlawfulness is not evident in the frame 
of circumstances that he knew, law renounces to his punishment as the superior’s 
liability maintenance allows to meet the existing prevention needs23. § 5, I WStG, 
§ 11, II SoldG and § 7, II UZwG represent, thus, a solution of culpability statement 
and of liability denial, which determines the non punishment of the subordinate.
Also Maurach and Zipf refer the issue of obedience to illegitimate orders essentially 
to the scope of Verbotsirrtum24. Their standing of principle is that the fact practiced in 
execution of an illegitimate order is always unlawful, and the order may have effects 
only in the domain of fact’s liability (Tatverantwortung) or of the agent’s culpability. 
Therefore, they establish a basic distinction between two types of situations25: the 
illegitimacy of the order is known by the agent; and the subordinate is not aware of the 
illegitimate nature of the order directed to him for the execution of a typical fact. Only 
in the latter, according to their understanding, may there be an exclusion of criminal 
liability, at the level of culpability, by direct effect of the authority order.
The exclusion of criminal liability by obedience occurs, according to Maurach 
and Zipf, only when the subordinate is not aware of the illegitimacy of the order, 
grounding, therefore, in an error about prohibition which operates at the culpability 
stage26. The fundament of exclusion of guilt cannot be duress, as it implies a situation 
of psychic pressure which, by definition, does not exist when the subordinate is 
not aware of the illegitimacy of the order27. Here there is a lack of awareness of 
the unlawfulness, which, according to Maurach and Zipf’s understanding, must be 
solved at the level of error about prohibition.
Once defined the content of the error about prohibition, Maurach and Zipf address 
the regulation in this concrete domain of authority’s orders. They consider that a 
distinction should be made between civil servants and soldiers, as the situation of the 
latter is disciplined by special dispositions.
Regarding civil servants, is applicable the general regulation of error about 
prohibition foreseen in § 17 StGB, and so that error does not affect the dolus nature 
22  Roxin, AT3, § 21, no. 43.
23  Roxin, AT3, § 21, no. 73. Close to Roxin, Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 12.
24  Maurach / Zipf, DP-PG7, I, § 38, no. 24 et seq. So, Maurach, Reinhart, Deutsches Strafrecht. 
Allgemeiner Teil, Karlsruhe: C. F. Müller, 1954, § 36, III, B, although analysing the issue in the context 
of exclusion of responsibility for the fact.
25  Maurach, AT, § 36, III, B, e Maurach / Zipf, DP-PG7, I, § 34, no. 20.
26  Cf. Maurach, AT, § 36, III, B, 3, e Maurach / Zipf, DP-PG7, I, § 38, no. 24 et seq.
27  Maurach, AT, § 36, III, B, 3, e Maurach / Zipf, DP-PG7, I, § 38, no. 27.
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of the subordinate’s conduct, and it may exclude guilt if it is inevitable. Military 
subordination is ruled by the aforementioned § 5, I WStG, which determines the 
subordinate’s liability in those cases he is aware of the order’s criminal illegitimacy 
or that illegitimacy is evident through circumstances he knew. The second condition 
is, according to Zipf, a special rule of the error about prohibition, which constitutes 
an expression of the limited theory of dolus (eingeschränkte Vorsatztheorie)28. 
According to this theory, error about prohibition determines the exclusion of intent, 
but in the event that the agent reveals law blindness he will deserve a reproach, 
according to which the penalty corresponding to the dolus crime is to be applied to 
him29. It is precisely in this sense that Zipf interprets § 5, I WStG.
Zipf applies § 5, I WStG to the situations of error about prohibition in which the 
subordinate incurs when executing an illegitimate order. However, as he expands the 
content of error about prohibition, § 5, I WStG works also in cases of error about the 
presuppositions of a justification cause. While the applicability of this disposition to 
cases of error about the type is implicitly admitted by Zipf, in Lenckner we find a 
clear and express defence of that application.
Regarding compulsory illegitimate orders, Lenckner places himself in the 
justificationist theory, defending in what concerns the compliance of criminally 
illegitimate orders, a set of solutions which determine a wide range in the exclusion of 
unlawfulness of the respective execution conduct30. The situations that do not benefit 
from the exclusion of unlawfulness are object of a dogmatic treatment evidenced 
by clear distinction between the several hypotheses in which the subordinate may 
benefit from an exclusion of criminal liability at the level of guilt31. As in most 
German literature, to Lenckner the whole problem regards error. Lenckner clearly 
separates the cases of error about typical factuality and of error about the material 
presuppositions of a justifying type of the cases of lack of awareness of the ordained 
conduct’s unlawfulness. Within each of those groups, he distinguishes also the 
general civil servants from the execution civil servants and soldiers, given that § 7, 
II UZwG, § 11, II, 2 SoldG and § 5, I WStG are applicable to the latter.
These last precepts dictate a special discipline of excuse for execution civil 
servants and for soldiers, which reflects both on error about the typical factuality 
and about the objective presuppositions of a justifying type, and on error about 
unlawfulness32.
28  Maurach / Zipf, DP-PG7, I, § 38, no. 29.
29  Cf., in detail, Correia, Eduardo, I, p. 408 et seq.
30  Sch / Sch / Lenckner26, before § 32, no. 10 et seq. and 86 et seq.
31  Sch / Sch / Lenckner26, before § 32, no. 121.
32  Sch / Sch / Lenckner26, before § 32, no. 121. In this sense, cf. also Baumann / Weber, AT10, 
§ 23, no. 52, who consider that such dispositions represent a change benefiting the agent of the error 
general regulation of §§ 16 and 17 of StGB. 
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Also Jescheck and Weigend detach from the main doctrine and consider that 
unlawful acting in fulfilment of service orders forms an excusing cause for excuse 
of an autonomous nature, although it represents simultaneously a special rule of 
error about prohibition33. The legal fundament of excuse by obedience to superior 
orders for execution civil servants and for soldiers lays, according to Jescheck 
and Weigend, in § 7, II UZwG, in § 11, II, 2 SoldG and in § 5, I WStG. Like the 
other excusing causes, the reason why the fulfilment of a conduct threatened with 
a penalty in case of execution of an order may be excused lays in a substantial 
decrease of the unlawful of action and of the culpability of the fact. The excuse may 
occur either in those cases when, acting with the intention of fulfilling the duty of 
obedience which lays on him, the subordinate trusts that he acts according to the law, 
being notwithstanding wrong in what regards the mandatory nature of the order34, 
or when the subordinate is not aware of the criminal relevance of the ordained fact. 
Legal order admits excuse given the limits to the ability of controlling the legality 
of the order imposed upon the subordinate and the hierarchical structure of the state, 
which inspires in the subordinate a spirit of trust in the authority of the superior 
and the custom of obeying and which transfers to the superior the responsibility for 
the material validity of the issued orders. In any case, Jescheck and Weigend point 
out to the fact that a non compulsory order may be a cause for excuse only when 
it is considered by the subordinate as compulsory and it could be so35. Criterion 
that corresponds, grosso modo, to the presuppositions in which exclusion of guilt 
depends on according to the mentioned legal dispositions.
3.2. Contrarily to what happens in German literature regarding § 5, I WStG and 
similar precepts, it is extremely scarce in Portuguese doctrine the reflexion hat has 
been dedicated to excusing undue obedience, foreseen in the general part of the 
Penal Code, since it was enforced, over twenty five years ago. The poor attention 
that excusing undue obedience has earned did not prevent, however, the appearance 
of different doctrinal positions concerning its fundament and field of application.
It must be pointed out that most doctrine considers, correctly, that excusing 
undue obedience has nothing to do with duress and it rather concerns the problem 
of error, regardless the fact that not always it is possible to understand what kind of 
mistake is concerned here.
Nevertheless, the main present doctrine formed in the context of excusing undue 
obedience separates distinctly between error about typical factuality and error 
about prohibition, understanding some that this is a special case of error about the 
33  Jescheck / Weigend, AT5, § 46, I, 4.
34  Jescheck / Weigend, AT5, § 46, I, 34.
35  Jescheck / Weigend, AT5, § 46, II.
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circumstances of the fact of article 16 of the Penal Code, and some others that it is a case 
of a specific regulation of error about unlawfulness of article 17 of the Penal Code.
Cavaleiro de Ferreira36 and Germano Marques da Silva identify excusing undue 
obedience with error about the circumstances of the fact or, at least, of one of it its 
modes.
In fact, in the sense that excusing undue obedience sets a case of error about the 
circumstances of the fact, more precisely of error about the presuppositions of a 
justifying type, Germano Marques da Silva states that «due to error about the order 
imposition, dolus would be excluded, pursuant to article 16, no. 2 of the Penal Code, 
but if error is unforgivable the liability by negligence, if that would be the case, 
would maintain»37. Therefore, «error excludes now culpability itself and not only 
dolus»38.
Diverging from the approach of excusing undue obedience to error about the 
circumstances of the fact of article 16 of the Penal Code, Figueiredo Dias places it 
in the domain of error about unlawfulness of article 17 of the Penal Code. According 
to this author, article 37 of the Penal Code aims at compensating the rigueur of the 
legal solution at the level of unlawfulness, as if, in tribute to the citizen’s rights 
and freedoms the justification is denied to the civil servant who executes an order 
not knowing that it is illegitimate, «it is the duty of the State to also care about the 
efficacy of the services it is required to render; and this will be jeopardized if the 
hierarchical subordinate who receives the order is always, by executing it, with «a 
foot in prison»»39.
Figueiredo Dias discards the hypothesis that excusing undue obedience is a 
matter of duress, considering that article 37 of the Penal Code has rather to do «with 
error about unlawfulness in which, because of the official or of the service order, 
the agent may have incurred. Here the legislator introduced a special regulation 
concerning which would result from the provisioned in article 17. What is present 
here is, ultimately, a special regulation of the problem of lack of awareness of 
the unlawful from the subordinate who received and executed the order»40. The 
36  Ferreira, Cavaleiro de, Lições de Direito Penal, Verbo, 1992, p. 358.
37  Silva, Germano Marques da, Direito Penal Português. Parte Geral, II, Lisboa: Verbo, 1998, p. 
218.
38  Silva, Marques da, DP-PG, II, p. 218.
39  Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 2.
40  Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 5. In the same sense, Palma, Maria Fernanda, 
A Justificação por Legítima Defesa como Problema de Delimitação de Direitos, AAFDL, 1990, p. 233 
et seq., to whom article 37 of the Penal Code «seems to regard only error about the second enunciated 
kind [error about the legitimacy of the order] (indirect error about unlawfulness), constituting a special 
norm concerning article 17 of the Penal Code or simply one concretization of it», and Carvalho, 
Américo Taipa de, Direito Penal – Parte Geral, Volume II: Teoria Geral do Crime, Universidade 
Católica, 2004, § 922 et seq.
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specificity of article 37 of the Penal Code regarding the general regulation of error 
about unlawfulness is its criterion of error censorship. Comparing with article 17 
of the Penal Code, the censorship scope defined by article 37 of the Penal Code 
is less tight, hence resulting a bigger range of exclusion of guilt. In any case, the 
criterion of censorship of article 37 of the Penal Code also participates of the idea 
of «maintenance in the agent of a straight — however wrong — ethical-juridical 
conscious, grounded in an attitude of fidelity or correspondence to ethically relevant 
requirements or points of view»41 and does not identify with a minor error avoidance, 
as per the understanding, for example, of Roxin regarding § 5 WStG.
Although Figueiredo Dias tries to escape here to avoidance as a criterion of 
censorship of error about unlawfulness, which he has always refused in the general 
context of the issue of the lack of unlawfulness awareness, the fact is that article 
37 of the Penal Code causes the exclusion of culpability to be dependent from the 
evidence of the illegitimacy of the order. Therefore, as the author himself admits, it 
is difficult to articulate the thought of straight conscious with an idea of evidence. 
That articulation is proposed in the following terms: whenever in the frame of the 
circumstances known by the subordinate «the issue of unlawfulness of the fact 
reveals questionable, controversial, obscure or even just little clear a cause of 
exclusion of culpability is verified» 42.
4. In a broad vision of the Portuguese doctrine and of the German literature, one 
observe that, in face of legal precepts with a similar literal content, determinants of 
the exclusion of guilt in case of obedience to illegitimate orders, three tendencies 
are formed in the definition of the juridical nature. Some think that it is a special 
regulation of error about unlawfulness or of error about prohibition. Others point out 
to error about the circumstances of the fact. A maximalist thesis, directly or indirectly 
through an enlargement of the scope of error about prohibition, encompasses in 
these dispositions either situations of error about prohibition, or of error about the 
type. That broad vision cannot, however, ignore the profound differences between 
the Portuguese system and the German one, either in the context of superior orders, 
or in the scope of the theory of mistake.
Regarding superior orders, German experience reveals a bigger tendency to 
admit the exclusion of unlawfulness of the typical fact committed while executing 
an illegitimate order43, through special concepts of unlawfulness, the application 
of the theory of error on the material presuppositions of a justification cause or 
the compulsory illegitimate orders. Hence, in a significant part of the situations, 
41  Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 10.
42  Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 11.
43  Cf. Brandão, Nuno, Justificação e Desculpa por Obediência em Direito Penal, p. 179 et seq.
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the criminal liability is excluded on the ground of fact’s lack of unlawfulness. It 
is essentially there that, therefore, the safeguard of the subordinate’s position is 
promoted. Generally, one does not wait for the judgement on the culpability to 
—using the image of Figueiredo Dias— give the civil servant the signal that he can 
act without fearing going to prison in consequence of the execution of the order.
A possible detachment from the German doctrine is also suggested by the deep 
theoretical divergence that separates Portuguese and German comprehension about 
mistake in criminal law, and which is evidenced in the interpretation of articles 16 
and 17 of the Portuguese Penal Code and of §§ 16 and 17 StGB44. While the German 
regulation lays on the error about the type and error about the prohibition dichotomy, 
the Portuguese regulation parts from the distinction between the intellectual or 
knowledge error and the moral or valuation error, which expresses the essential 
of the model proposed by Figueiredo Dias in his O Problema da Consciência da 
Ilicitude em Direito Penal45. Because of this basic difference, error about prohibition 
of § 17 StGB has a broader range than error about unlawfulness of article 17 of the 
Portuguese Penal Code. In fact, the situations that falls in the scope of the German 
error about prohibition is split in the Portuguese regulation between the pure error 
about unlawfulness of article 17 and error about prohibitions of article 16-1, 2nd part 
of the Portuguese Penal Code.
The aforementioned differences impose caution in possible transpositions from 
the German thought to the exegesis of excusing undue obedience defined in the 
Portuguese law, where precisely the whole problematic of obedience to superior 
illegitimate orders and the essential of the issue of error converges. Caution which 
must be doubled in face of the ambiguity of the redaction of article 37 of the Penal 
Code46, which, as the homologous German precepts, (§ 7, II UZwG, § 11, II, 2 
SoldG and § 5, I WStG), may allow the most diverse interpretations.
The legal text of the excusing undue obedience does not allow to immediately 
associate it to error about unlawfulness. What is decisive for considering that one is 
towards an error about unlawfulness is the consequence of the error presupposed by 
excusing undue obedience, the exclusion of culpability. If law establishes a general 
44  Therefore, Dias, Jorge de Figueiredo, Temas Básicos da Doutrina Penal, Coimbra Editora, 
2001, p. 288, states that «there is, between the aforementioned §§ 16 and 17 of the German Penal Code 
and articles 16 and 17 of the current Portuguese Penal Code, notorious redaction differences, which 
traduce relevant doctrine divergences».
45  Dias, Figueiredo, Temas Básicos, p. 291, but also Silva, Marques da, DP-PG, II, p. 204, and 
Beleza, Teresa Pizarro / Pinto, Frederico de Lacerda da Costa, O Regime Legal do Erro e as Normas 
Penais em Branco (Ubi lex distinguit…), Almedina, 1999, p. 22 et seq.
46  Palma, Maria Fernanda, A Justificação por Legítima Defesa, p. 233, pointed to the ambiguity 
of the redaction of article 37, and Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 4, considered that «the 
regulation included in article 37 is very far from being clear and free from founded doubts».
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regulation in which it distinguishes the error that excludes dolus, which it calls error 
about the circumstances of the fact, and the error that excludes culpability, which 
it calls error about unlawfulness, then one may think that, being the exclusion of 
culpability the effect of the error present in excusing undue obedience, this is a sort 
of the kind of error about unlawfulness47. 
We do not consider, however, that excusing undue obedience is a specific 
regulation of error about unlawfulness of article 17 of the Portuguese Penal Code.
The acceptance that the error implied in excusing undue obedience has the nature 
of error about unlawfulness helplessly compromises the internal coherence of a 
theory of error based in the difference between error of the psychological conscious 
and error of ethic conscious, defended precisely by Figueiredo Dias, and which 
we understand to be the one that is most consistent with articles 16 and 17 of the 
Penal Code. Seen as a case of error about unlawfulness, article 37 of the Penal Code 
becomes a strange body inside that theory, which is very hardly able to explain it.
The incompatibility of excusing undue obedience with error about unlawfulness 
and its threat to the internal coherence of a model of error based on the intellectual 
error / moral error dichotomy derives firstly from the fact that article 37 of the 
Penal Code allows that guilt can be excluded in those situations in which the 
circumstances known by the agent do not correspond to those that are actually 
verified. The reference of article 37 of the Penal Code to the evidence in the frame of 
the circumstances known by the civil servant forces the conclusion that the precept 
leads to situations in which the agent is not aware of the whole factuality which 
forms unlawfulness and he is not, therefore, in a condition to even be able to assess 
the unlawfulness of the act that he commits.
The non evidence of the fact unlawfulness as a criterion of non censorship origins 
another difficulty in the understanding of an excusing undue obedience connoted 
with an error about unlawfulness grounded in the intellectual error / moral error 
dichotomy. What is determinant in this dichotomy in order to speak about a true 
lack of unlawfulness conscious is the unconformity of the agent’s ethic conscious 
regarding valuation recognized by the legal order48. Therefore, while being at stake 
not a lack of science, but a true lack of conscious, the criterion of non censorship 
of error about unlawfulness does not lay on the inevitability of the error49, as it is 
generally defended by the theses which part from the error about the type / error 
about the prohibition dichotomy. While being that one the content of error about 
47  Cf. Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 8.
48  Dias, Jorge de Figueiredo, O Problema da Consciência da Ilicitude em Direito Penal, 4th ed., 
Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1995, § 15, II, 3.
49  Cf. Dias, Figueiredo, O Problema da Consciência da Ilicitude, § 12, III and § 17, and DP-PG, 
I, 2004, 23.º Cap., § 4 et seq.
301
The Defence of Superior Orders in Portuguese and in Compared Military ...
unlawfulness, the non censorship may only be stated when «the mistake or the error 
of ethical-conscience, which is reflected in the fact, does not found in an worthless 
and juridically reproachable quality of the agent’s personality, for which he has to 
answer»50.
We do not see how the criterion of non censorship foreseen in article 37 of the 
Penal Code may be encompassed on that criterion of non censorship proposed by 
Figueiredo Dias, summarized in the idea of straight conscious, characterized by the 
persistence in the agent of a general attitude of fidelity towards the requirements 
of the legal order. In fact, regardless the way how one conceives the criterion of 
non censorship of article 37 of the Penal Code, one cannot extract any conclusion 
from it concerning the attitude that the agent documents in the fact. Circumstance 
which, naturally, makes it impossible for article 37 of the Penal Code to work, as the 
criterion defined in the norm so that it may trigger a juridical effect is not adequate 
to respond the problem raised by those cases which, according to the hypothesis, 
must be subsumed in it.
All points, therefore, to the conclusion that excusing undue obedience does 
not represent a form of error about unlawfulness. It seems to us that only a pure 
conceptualism, held to the idea that any error which excludes culpability has to be an 
error about unlawfulness, may justify the qualification of excusing undue obedience 
as a case of mistake about unlawfulness.
In our perspective, those situations in which the soldier assumes that the order 
is transmitted under a legal authorization which in reality does not exist or wrongly 
assumes that the order is issued still within the boundaries of a legal authorization 
(error about the existence or the boundaries of a justification cause) do not have to do 
with article 37 of the Penal Code, but rather with article 17 of the Penal Code, as they 
represent cases of error about unlawfulness. And we are also still in the domain of 
article 17 and not of article 37 when the soldier, representing notwithstanding all the 
factuality important for the formation of a correct judgment about the unlawfulness 
of the ordained fact, acts with no awareness of the unlawfulness of that same fact, 
or despite having that conscious, he thinks, however, that obedience is due as he 
considers that any order whatsoever must be executed, regardless its conformity to 
the criminal law51. 
5. The compatibility of article 37 of the Penal Code with a general theory of 
error firmed in the contraposition between knowledge error and valuation error is a 
50  Dias, Figueiredo, O Problema da Consciência da Ilicitude, § 17, II, 2.
51  Most German doctrine rightly considers that this latter case sets an error about the prohibition 
in principle unforgivable – cf., by all, Stratenwerth, Verantwortung und Gehorsam, p. 183 et seq., and 
Jescheck / Weigend, AT5, § 46, I, 46.
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necessary condition for the definition of the regulation of excusing undue obedience 
and for the determination of its juridical nature. However, the frames of the error 
doctrine are insufficient for a complete and accurate understanding of excusing 
undue obedience.
Excusing undue obedience cannot be detached from the problem of the existence 
or the non existence of the so-called compulsory illegitimate orders in criminal 
matter. In fact, together with article 31st-2, c), of the Penal Code and with article 36-
2 of the Penal Code, article 37 of the Penal Code embodies a normative frame which 
forms a coherent whole and which parts may only be adequately understood parting 
from a fundamental principle which is reflected in them: the principle that an order 
may only justify the typical fact carried out in its execution if it is according to the 
law, i. e., legitimate.
This principle has, however, as consequence the possibility of a criminal charge 
against the subordinate who carries out that illegal order. This is nothing but a natural 
consequence in a State governed by the rule of law, which completely disregards 
any irresponsibility reserve for the plain circumstance that the agent acts under 
superior orders (article 271 of the Portuguese Republic Constitution). Nevertheless, 
it is common the understanding that it is not fair that State requires its soldiers 
an obedience as quick and complete as possible to the orders issued to them and 
afterwards abandon them, exposing them to the roughness of criminal justice, if 
it is concluded that, after all, the order was not of due obedience for contradicting 
criminal law. As Eduardo Correia concludes, without a precept as article 37 of the 
Penal Code «the servants would be in a very difficult position towards the criminal 
law»52. 
Between the problem of (non) justification by fulfilment of illegitimate orders 
and the excusing undue obedience there is an entangled relationship, which from 
our point of view implies that the application field of excusing undue obedience is 
formed by those situations in which criminal unlawfulness is stated in the context 
of the issue of compulsory illegitimate orders by the principle of termination of the 
duty of obedience in criminal matter: situations in which there is the practice of a 
unlawful criminal fact in the fulfilment of an illegitimate order by unawareness of 
its illegitimacy.
The hypothesis of article 37 of the Penal Code —«executes an order without knowing 
that it leads to the practice of a crime»— respects, then, to those cases of unlawfulness 
which derives from the practice of a typical fact in obedience to an illegitimate order 
in which the subordinate is not aware of the fact that the presuppositions of the legal 
authorization which would legitimate that order do not verify.
52  Actas das Sessões da Comissão Revisora do Código Penal, Parte Geral, I, 1965, p. 255. In the 
same direction, Dias, Figueiredo, DP-PG, I, 2004, 24.º Cap., § 2 et seq.
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Excusing undue obedience represents, thus, a special regulation in face of the 
general regulation of error about the presuppositions of a justification cause foreseen 
in article 16-253 of the Penal Code. The justification of the typical fact executed 
by the soldier who acts in fulfilment of an order depends on the legitimacy of that 
order. Therefore, when the order is illegitimate, the typical fact is also unlawful. This 
conclusion is valid even in those cases when the subordinate acts thinking that all 
the material presuppositions of which the legitimacy of the order depends are met. 
The positive law expressly establishes that, in such circumstances, there is no duty 
of obedience that may be alleged to justify the executed fact. While the legitimacy 
of the order is a presupposition of the justification of the typical fact committed in 
its execution, the fulfilment of an illegitimate order determined by an erroneous trust 
in its legitimacy would always benefit from an exclusion of the dolus on the stage 
of culpability, by application of article 16-2 of the Penal Code. It is here, however, 
that article 37 of the Penal Code intervenes, closing the door to a possible negligent 
censorship.
The error found in excusing undue obedience is, therefore, an error of knowledge 
and not an error of valuation. It is then understood that the criterion of non censorship 
we find in it is related to the avoidance of the error. According to article 37 of the 
Penal Code, error is not censured when the illegitimacy of the order is not obvious 
in the frame of circumstances known by the civil servant. This criterion slows down 
the requirements which could be imposed for the exclusion of the kind of negligent 
guilt should the issue be solved in the frame defined by article 16-3 of the Penal 
Code: violation by the agent of the «duty to seek information, with the imposed care, 
about the circumstantial reality of the situation in which he acts»54.
The law assumes that in those cases when the illegitimacy of the order is not 
evident from the subordinate’s point of view, he will not feel an impetus to check 
out if the situation of fact which would legitimate the issue of the order is verified, 
and by rule will trust in its legality. The assumption of the opposite would be far 
from the real world, as normally the careful and considerate soldier carries out the 
order transmitted to him with no further delay and questions whenever he has not 
reasons to doubt its illegitimacy in face of the circumstances which are known to 
him. For this reason it is considered not censurable the error about the legitimacy of 
the order when the facts known by the agent do not alert him towards the criminal 
unlawfulness of the ordained fact and do not dissuade him from executing it.
This means, however, that not all the subordinate’s error may escape from a 
censorship judgement. The soldier who receives an order which, according to his 
perspective of the facts, is notoriously incompatible with criminal legality has 
53  In this direction, as aforementioned, in text, Silva, Marques da, DP-PG, II, p. 217 et seq.
54  Dias, Figueiredo, O Problema da Consciência da Ilicitude, § 21, I, 3.
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the duty of taking the necessary and possible measures in order to check out that 
unconformity. If, notwithstanding the warning for the illegitimacy of the order 
that derives from the frame of circumstances known by him, the soldier does not 
withdraw its execution, he deserves, in principle, censorship for the violation of the 
duty of clarification which is imposed upon him under those circumstances. This 
censorship is not grounded in an attitude of opposition or hostility in face of the 
legal interest protected by the incrimination, once the agent does not get to know 
the whole circumstantial reality from which the illegitimacy of the order results. 
What determines censorship is rather the attitude of carelessness manifested in the 
fulfilment of the order, once, before the evidence of illegitimacy, the average soldier 
placed in his position would certainly have grasp the knowledge of that reality, using 
due care.
The criterion of non censorship defined in article 37 of the Penal Code passes, 
thus, the idea that when the illegitimacy of the order is not evident in the frame of 
circumstances known by the civil servant or by the soldier, the unlawful criminal 
fact committed by him does not represent the expression of a careless or precipitated 
attitude towards the legal interest protected by the incrimination which characterizes 
the negligent culpability. That is the reason for the law to determine the exclusion 
of the agent’s guilt. However, what is herewith in cause is not exactly a denial of 
culpability, but rather a denial of the substrate on which a judgment of culpability 
may be based. The error about the illegitimacy of the order necessarily implies the 
detachment of the dolus type of guilt. Culpability may, however, be grounded on a 
type of negligent guilt, which materiality «resides in the careless or inconsiderate
attitude revealed by the agent and which fundaments his fact and, hence, in the 
person’s worthless qualities which express in the fact»55. Therefore, if the soldier’s 
error is not censurable, besides the dolus type of guilt, also the type of negligent 
culpability should be considered excluded, and consequently will not subsist any 
material content on which culpability shall be grounded. This is, from our point of 
view, the exact meaning of the exclusion of culpability foreseen in article 37 of the 
Penal Code.
An excusing undue obedience thus conceived is perfectly compatible with a 
theory of error grounded in the knowledge error / valuation error dichotomy and 
avoids the difficulties of an excusing undue obedience identified with error about 
unlawfulness.
This is also a model which finds parallel in the interpretation given to similar 
legal dispositions of other rules. We have seen that, in German doctrine, Lencker 
and Baumann / Weber, although giving § 5, I WStG a much wider range than 
the one we have pointed out to article 37 of the Penal Code, also indicate it as a 
55  Dias, Figueiredo, Temas Básicos, p. 376 et seq.
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special case of error about the presuppositions of a justifying type which reflects 
in the definition of negligent censorship56. Also in Italian doctrine it is usual the 
understanding that article 51-3 of the Codice Penale — according to which, besides 
the superior, «risponde del reato altresì chi ha eseguito l’ordine, salvo che, per errore 
di fatto, abbia ritenuto di obbedire a un ordine legittimo» — regulates a situation of 
error about the presuppositions of a justification cause57, that, according to some, 
embodies a special regulation of that error in obedience matter, which determines 
the exclusion of culpability, by contraposition to the general regulation of article 59-
4 of the Italian Penal Code, from which only an exclusion of dolus results58.
Finally, this conception is the one that best suits the legal decision of – by 
eliminating the figure of compulsory illegitimate orders in criminal matter and 
consequently denying the justification to the typical facts performed in the 
unawareness of the order’s illegitimacy – joining the long tradition of recognizing 
only excusing nature to that error which determines the obedience to illegitimate 
orders.
56  Cf. Sch / Sch / Lenckner26, before § 32, no. 121, and Baumann / Weber, AT10, § 23, no. 52. 
In a close direction, cf. Maurach / Zipf, DP-PG7, I, § 38, no. 25, and Jescheck / Weigend, AT5, § 46, 
I, 3.
57  So, Santoro, L’Ordine del Superiore, p. 254 et seq., Padovani, «Ordine Criminoso…», p. 
478, Viganò, Codice Penale Commentato, art. 51, no. 92 et seq., Fiore, DP-PG, p. 416, Marinucci
/ Dolcini, DP-PG, p. 188 et seq., Mantovani, DP-PG4, p. 188 et seq., and Bartolo, «Il Caso 
Priebke…», p. 1064 et seq.
58  Cf. Santoro, Arturo, L’Ordine del Superiore nel Diritto Penale, UTET, 1957, p. 255 et seq., 
Padovani, Tullio, «Ordine Criminoso e Obbedienza Gerarchica nel Diritto Penale Italiano», Dei Delitti 
e Delle Pene, 1987, no. 3, p. 479, Viganò, Francesco, Codice Penale Commentato. Parte Generale 
(coord. Emilio Dolcini / Giorgio Marinucci), Milano: IPSOA, 1999, art. 51, no. 94, and Bartolo, 
Pasquale, «Il Caso Priebke e la Sentenza della Corte Militare di Appello di Roma», L’Indice Penale, 
1999, p. 1066. Against, defending that article 51-3 is a mere listing of the general principles of error 
of fact, persisting the possibility of an accountability for negligence, Mantovani, Ferrando, Diritto 
Penale. Parte Generale, 4th ed., CEDAM, 2001, p. 254 et seq., Marinucci, Giorgio / Dolcini, Emilio, 
Diritto Penale. Parte Generale, Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 2002, p. 189, and Fiore, Carlo, Diritto 
Penale. Parte Generale, I, UTET, 1993, p. 416.

